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1. Introduction 
 
Faults detection and their diagnosis play an essen-
tial role in the industry. The search for signatures or fault 
indicators has as a purpose to characterize the operation of 
the system by identifying the type and origin of each of the 
failures. Indeed, they contribute, by a rapid and early de-
tection, to saving points of availability and production to 
the capital invested in the production tool. 
In the last decade, maintaining and diagnosing 
machines is an effective tool for early faults detection and 
continuous tracking of their evolution in time. Machine 
maintenance requires a good understanding of the phe-
nomena related to the onset and development of faults. 
Detecting their occurrence at an early stage and following 
their evolution is of a great interest [1]. It is possible to 
distinguish three types of approach for surveillance, de-
pending on the nature of the monitoring element: analytical 
model methods, data based methods, and knowledge based 
methods.  
Fault diagnosis is considered as the problem of 
multi-classification after the fault data is detected. Various 
approaches developed for this purpose can be mainly di-
vided into two categories. The first is mathematical model-
based, such as multinomial logistic regression and bayesi-
an network (BN). The second is related to the artificial 
intelligence, (i.e. fuzzy classifier, artificial neural networks 
(ANN), SVM and ELM) [2].  
The structure and relationship of components are 
complicated in rotary complex machines, and the graphical 
construction of (BN) can be tedious and difficult, a fault 
tree is considered to simplify determining causality be-
tween components. The construction of the Fault tree al-
lows constructing a bayesian network for exploit the mass 
of existing data. Which means that any fault tree can be 
transformed into a corresponding bayesian network by 
creating a binary bayesian network node for each event in 
the fault tree? Moreover, in the context of transforming the 
fault tree into a bayesian network, several works have been 
carried out (more details on these transformation steps are 
given in reference) [3].  
Bayesian network probabilistic graphical models 
have been widely used to solve various problems (for ex-
ample diagnosis, failure prediction and risk analysis, clas-
sification) [4]. Modelling by using bayesian network is 
performed in two steps: the quantitative step (estimating 
the probability distribution tables) and the qualitative step 
(construction of the network or the graph).  
The phase of the quantitative analysis in the con-
struction of bayesian networks is considered a very diffi-
cult task in estimating the a prior marginal and conditional 
probabilities of each node of the network. A prior probabil-
ity is based on the knowledge provided by expert of the 
process or obtained by learning methode or algorithm from 
an experimental or experience feedback database [5].  
The priori information, the posterior information 
and the likelihood in bayesian probability theory are repre-
sented by probability distributions. The prior probabilities 
represent the distribution of knowledge or belief concern-
ing a subject or a variable before any relevant evidence 
taken into account.  A   posterior probability is the condi-
tional probability on collected data by a combination of a 
prior probability and likelihood via Bayes' theorem. The 
likelihood is a parameter function of a statistical model, 
reflecting the possibility of observing a variable when 
these parameters have a value [6]. On the other side, in 
fault tree method the probability of occurrence of the top 
event, intermediaries vents are governed by their basic 
events; the occurrence of the latter can be modeled by var-
ious statistical distributions (Exponential, Normal, 
Lognormal, Weibull, Gamma ...) [7].  
The method of fault tree is widely used in the 
field of the reliability. It offers a framework privileged to 
the deductive and inductive analysis by means of a tree 
structure of logical gates [8].  
The procedure that uses fault trees for diagnosis 
purposes is abductive, focusing first on adverse events and 
then identifying their causes. A fault tree is established as a 
logical diagram and has the undesirable event at the top. 
The immediate causes that produce this event are then hi-
erarchized using logical symbols "AND" and "OR". To 
perform a correct diagnosis from the fault trees, these must 
largely represent all the causal relationships of the system, 
capable of explaining all possible fault scenarios.  
In FT Analysis, the analysis is realized in two 
steps: a quantitative step in which, on the basis of the 
probabilities assigned to the failure events of the basic 
components, the probability of occurrence of the top event 
(and of any internal event corresponding to a logical sub-
system) is calculated; a qualitative step in which the logical 
expression of the top event is derived in terms of prime 
applicants (the minimal cut-sets) [3].  
Works on bayesian network and system safety 
have recently been developed by [3] in 2005; explaining 
how the fault tree can be achieved using bayesian network 
static. Moreover, works which concern applications to reli-
ability are numerous; [9] in 2003, [10] in 2006 provide also 
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the use of bayesian network for modelling purpose of the 
cause-and-effect relationships between the degradation, the 
causes and consequences, and calculation, alike, of the 
reliability of complex mechanical systems. Bayesian net-
works can also take a dynamic dimension, [11] describes 
the representation of dynamic fault trees by dynamic 
bayesian networks.  
The advantage of probabilistic graphical models 
is interesting graphical representation of models, easy to 
understand and analyze. In addition, the probabilistic fail-
ure analysis evaluates the probability of failure of a com-
plex system that its weak points can be identified.  
Bayesian network are increasingly used in various 
fields and applications such as operating safety, risk analy-
sis, maintenance, as well as finance [4], and the field of 
image processing [12].  
Bayesian network and fault tree have a probabilis-
tic aspect. The main objective of the present work is to 
show the strong contribution of these tools in the field of 
fault diagnosis and enhance the knowledge in the area of 
ensuring reliability and maintaining of mechanical systems 
among simulated scenarios. 
 
2. Methodology of work 
 
The main purpose of this works is to give a meth-
odological approach based on the transformation method 
of fault tree into bayesian network to model a complex 
system.  This work is divided into: 
 Qualitative exploitation of events for the fault tree 
representation. 
  Define the undesired event to be analyzed; ex-
plicitly shows all the different relationships that 
are necessary to result in the top event. 
  Exploits the existing data (historical data base) of 
the system under study, to quantify the failures 
probability. 
 Estimate the failures probability of events by us-
ing Weibull model (failure probabilities of events 
are normalized to become prior failure probabili-
ties). 
  Deriving the graphical structure of the bayesian 
network via transforming the Fault Tree into 
bayesian network according to the proposed 
methodology. 
In order to diagnose industrial system and evalu-
ate their reliability, in the absence of analytical model, it is 
possible to carefully analyze the history of their behavior 
over time. At the end of this study, a fault diagnosis of 
strategic motor pump at the Annaba ARCOLOR-METAL 
(Algeria) is presented. 
 
2.1. Bayesian network  
 
A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical 
model that represents a set of random variables represented 
by nodes, bounded by oriented arcs and accompanied by 
their conditional independencies. In a formal way, a 
Bayesian network is defined by [13]:  
 Its graphical component represented by a grapheG di-
rected acyclic (DAG) comprising nodes X , and arcs
E ,  E,XG  . 
 Its quantitative component X represented by probabil-
ity tables (PT) for parent nodes and conditional proba-
bility tables (CPT) for descendant’s nodes, arcs 
   ))(/( iii XparentsXPXX  .. 
 A set of random variables associated with nodes, arcs 
 nXXXX ,.., 21 , and the joint distribution function 
arcs  XP
 
consisting of: 
 
    


n
i
iin XC/XpX,....,X,Xp
1
21
,
 
(1) 
 
where  iXP  is the set of causes (parents) of iX  on the 
graphe G . 
BN used Bayes theorem to update the prior belief 
of variables given observations of other variables. For tow 
event 
1
X  and
2
X , provided that arcs   02 XP consisting 
the relationship of joints probability to conditional and 
marginal probability are written as: 
  
 
 
   
 
1 2 1
1 2
2
/
/
P X P X X
p X X
P X
 . (2) 
 
with  
1
Xp  is Priori probability (or marginal, or occur-
rence probability) of event 
1
X it is prior in the sense that it 
does not take into account any information about 
2
X , 
 
2
Xp  is Marginal probabilities of event 
2
X ,  
21
X/Xp
is Posterior probability (or conditional probability) of 
1
X
knowing 
2
X ,  
12
X/Xp  is Likelihood function (or con-
ditional probability) of
2
X knowing
1
X . 
The marginal distribution of  
2
Xp is computed 
by: 
     
2 1 2 12 2 1
/ /p X p X X p X p X X p X
    
     
   
(3) 
2.2. Transformation of fault tree into bayesian network 
methodology 
 
Currently, modern machines and installations are 
becoming more complex and their failures can have severe 
consequences on production, at the same time; the graph-
ical construction of bayesian network can be tedious and 
difficult. We can then simplify based on fault tree to de-
termine causality between components. Fault tree construc-
tion allows building a bayesians network.  This step allows 
deriving the graphical structure of the bayesian network 
that represents the causal relationship between the different 
events of the system under study and exploits the mass of 
existing data.  
Building bayesian network from the fault tree   is 
to transform the graphical representation of the fault tree 
into bayesian network. Events and logic Gates (AND, OR) 
are the basic elements for the fault tree. However, the 
bayesian network use as basic elements nodes that repre-
senting events and arcs that model the dependences be-
tween events and relations causes - effect.  
There are several transformation methods of fault 
tree into bayesian network that consist to transforming the 
logical gates to nodes on the network, this methodes incre- 
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ase the nodes number and make complicated calculation. 
For this, the adopted method in this works consists to 
transform the different kinds of events of the fault tree to 
nodes in the associated bayesian networks, and the logic 
gates (AND, OR) not participating in the form of the 
graphical structure of the networks [3, 6]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Graphical and digital transformation of Fault tree into Bayesians network 
 
Next, the construction of a bayesian network from 
a fault tree lies in the estimation (quantification) of proba-
bilities, it consists in this step to assign probabilities of 
occurrence of basic events (primaries) of fault tree to node 
roots as probabilities a priori, but in case of induced events 
(intermediate) and final events (dreaded) associated proba-
bilities will be estimated on the basis of calculation of con-
ditional probabilities. In addition, in the subject of the 
transformation of fault tree into bayesian network multiple 
works have-been performed (more details on this transfor-
mation steps shown in reference [3, 6]), the transformation 
algorithm of fault tree into bayesians network is displayed 
in Fig. 1.  
 
3. Functional analysis of the motor-pump and  
application result  
 
3.1. Description and system modeling  
 
Modeling by using BN is performed in two steps:  
 Qualitative analysis of failures: construction of 
the network or the graph. 
 Quantitative analysis of failures: deriving or esti-
mating the probability distribution tables. 
Qualitative step allows deriving the graphical 
structure of the bayesian network that represents the causal 
relations ship between the different events in the motor 
pump G18A. 
As part of preventive maintenance, the motor- 
pump G18A plays a strategic role in the cooling of the iron 
rods getting out from the electric oven; its failures influ-
ence directly the continuity of service.  
After the functional decomposition of defects 
which affect the proper functioning of the motor pump 
(qualitative phase), the failure modes are classified into 
three main types (M: Mechanical, E: Electric, H: Hydrau-
lic), this qualitative analysis allows identifying failure 
modes and construction fault tree as shown in Fig (1), by 
transforming the fault tree into bayesian network. Each 
variable corresponds to a node. Model of Cause-effect and 
its generic structure are shown in Fig (2), and it is split into 
three levels:  
 Top Event (S) is the motor-pump is in field state (un-
desired event). 
 Basic undesirable events are (H111, H112, H113.  
H114, H21, H22, H23, H24, E41 E42, E11, M11, 
M12, M221, M222, M51, M52). 
 Intermediate events are the remaining nodes (conse-
quences). 
 The hypothesis used in our modeling concerns quanti-
tative analysis of   fault tree analysis is to assume that 
components corresponding to basic events follow adjusted 
Weibull law. This means that: 
t=tj,…tn; Times between failures following Weibull model, 
and the probability of having component (X) faulty at time 
t (alternatively the probability of occurrence of the basic 
event X= faulty)  is : 
 
 P (X= faulty, t) =   1
t
F t exp


 
 
     
  
 
. (4) 
 
Where: t  represent time between failures. 
The shape parameter   and the scale parameter, 
 , of the Weibull pdf are obtained by maximizing the fol-
lowing log-verisimilitude: 
 
 
1
1
, ,
n
i i
i
i
t t
L t ln exp
 

 
  


      
      
       
  (5)  
 
3.2. Inference and conditional probabilities 
 
Bayesian inference is the process or the logic to 
calculate or revise the probability of belief (hypostasis). 
After describing the bayesian network, which will 
be used in the follow-up diagnosis of the motor pump, the 
failure probabilities of components are normalized to be-
come prior failure probabilities and reported in Table1.  
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When the BN structure is defined, the probabili-
ties are assigned (prior probabilities for the root nodes 
from Eq. (4), and conditional probabilities tables “CPTs” 
for their child node are given according to the gate types), 
the bayesian inference can then be conducted. It allows the 
computation of the marginal probability of a node (compo-
nent or event) by taking into account the interactions be-
tween the nodes of the network.  
The estimation of the Weibull parameters with the 
MATLAB function “wblfit” gives   = 3.21 and  
 =2681.22. 
 
 
 
Fig 2 Qualitative analysis by fault tree for the motor-pump system 
 
 
Fig. 3 Bayesian network of the motor-pump used in fault diagnosis 
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Table1 
Events and their priors and posteriors probability  
 
 
The model for characterizing the defects of the 
motor pump according to the principle of total probability 
theorem and bays law is given by: 
 
   HEMPSP  , (6) 
 
     , , , / , , , ,P S M E H P S M E H P M E H , (7) 
     
 SP
MPM/SP
S/MP  , (8) 
 
     
 SP
HPHSP
SHP
/
/  , (9) 
     
 SP
EPESP
SEP
/
/  . (10) 
Events of motor pump G18 A 
Nodes 
 
t, h 
F(t) 
 
Priori 
probability 
Posteriori 
probability 
  undesirable  
events 
motor-pump failed state S 
 
 Gate OR 18.9 
Mechanical defects M 
 
Gate OR 99.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of balance M5 
 
Gate OR 11.30 
Bending rotor M51 4464 0.9941 99.41 99.41 
Break of vanes M52 3552 0.9151 91.51 91.51 
Heating M1 
 
GATE OR 84.00 
Landing axial trust M11 1896 0.2802 28.02 28.02 
Wear of  motor  bearings M12 2520 0.5593 55.93 55.93 
Defect on the sealing ring M3 2016 0.3299 32.99 32.99 
Change of the mechanical seal M4 1776 0.2339 23.39 23.39 
Vibration M2 
 
Gate OR 97.90 
Mechanical noise M22 
 
Gate OR 85.10 
Change of valve M221 1728 0.2165 21.65 21.65 
Rolling fault at the pump  side M222 2808 0.6864 68.64 68.64 
Passage to the vibration limited value M21 792 0.0197 1.97 1.97 
Hydraulic defects H 
 
Gate OR 83.00 
 
Leakage H1 
 
Gate OR 83.2 
Leakage at the pump H11 
 
Gate OR 95.2 
Leakage at the mechanical  seal H111 2760 0.6662 66.62 66.62 
Leakage  at the Volute H112 1752 0.2252 22.52 22.52 
Leakage at the sealing ring H113 3696 0.9393 93.93 93.93 
Leakage at the seal H114 2040 0.3402 34.02 34.02 
Leakage at the pipe H12 1608 0.1761 17.61 17.61 
Increase of temperature H2 
 
GATE OR 81.4 
Degraded  lubrication oil H21 3048 0.7789 77.89 77.89 
Oil change H22 2328 0.4703 47.03 47.03 
Valve service defeat H23 2640 0.6138 61.38 61.38 
Filter filling in H24 3192 0.8262 82.62 82.62 
Loss of lubrication H3 1824 0.2520 25.20 25.20 
Electrical defects E 
 
GATE OR 98.3 
 
Short circuit E5 3168 0.8188 81.88 81.88 
Overloads E4 
 
GATE AND 49.1 
Activated contactor relay E41 1944 0.2297 22.97 22.97 
Expansion of bimetallic elements 
at the relay 
E42 2064 0.3506 35.06 35.06 
Electrical over-speed E3 2304 0.4591 45.91 45.91 
Grounding fault E2 1512 0.1470 14.70 14.70 
Overvoltage E1 2664 0.6245 62.45 62.45 
Beating at the rotor E11 2664 0.6245 62.45 62.45 
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We start by building a probability space on the in-
itiative knowledge, and we will see how beliefs vary.  
Subsystems probabilities of failures are normal-
ized to become prior probabilities and tow modalities will 
be kept: 
 
 Presence of defects (T : true) 
 Absence of defects (F: false) 
 Different questions arise: example, what is the 
probability that the motor-pump still works knowing that 
there is a mechanical fault? 
Table2 
Conditional probabilities of variables M, E, H,  
express the knowledge that the presence of different defaults in the motor-pump 
 
 TM  FM  
TE  FE  TE  FE  
TH  FH  TH  FH  TH  FH  TH  FH  
TS  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
FS  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
The achieved calculations from the equations (7), 
(8), (9) and (10) are presented in Fig. 4.   
We proceed firstly, that the inference makes it 
possible to propagate any probability instantiated or a pri-
ori on the belief of the other nodes. A new table of beliefs 
(probabilities) is obtained on each node, a kind of new 
state of the premises. In reality a model of probabilistic 
behavior is realized by the bayesian networks on the mo-
tor-pump. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Bayesian network of the motor-pump  
 
Fig. 4 shows the inference permit to obtain a new 
table of beliefs on each node. 
The high probabilities of failures of the motor-
pump (Top event) are in the order of 18.9%.  
The probabilities of failures of the motor-pump 
respectively mechanical, electrical and hydraulic knowing 
that there is a malfunction in the motor-pump equal to 
99.4, 98.3 and 83%; these allow us to update the beliefs to 
priori probability. 
 
3.3. Fault diagnosis 
 
According to the values of the posterior probabil-
ity in Table 1, the presence of defects in the motor-pump is 
mainly caused by event M51.which summarizes the out of 
balance (M51) defect is the most likely source to stop the 
motor-pump.  
The objective of this application is to make a di-
agnosis on the out of balance defect of the motor-pump 
(we will be interested on the presence or absence of the 
defect of bending rotor).  
The diagnosis in this application consists to com-
puting probabilities of new observations described in the 
following scenarios. 
Scenarios 1: this scenario is related to the 
system’s nominal operating condition. In this step, given 
the fact that there is no observed fault on the motor pump, 
the joint probability is equal to one. The BN corresponding 
to this scenario is given in Fig. 5. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Scenario 1: nominal operating condition 
 
Fig. 5 Shows that the probability of occurrence of 
the top event P (motor-pump failed state) = P(S) = 0.189, 
which are worth 18.9%and that the bending rotor, the 
break of vanes and the Out of balance remain in their 
respective nominal case (presence state defect) ),  with 
probabilities equal to 99.4, 91.5 and 9.03% respectively. 
These probabilities are quantitatively unacceptable, also 
since the machine is strategic and in order to optimize the 
operation security, it is mandatory to seek for identification 
of the faults’ root causes of the system to better plan the 
maintenance actions and to identify the preventive 
solutions to minimize this percentage.  
The high probability 99.4% means that the 
bending rotor (M51) is the most likely event to stop the 
motor-pump and should be treated as a priority. 
Scenario 2: (Absence of fault on the out of bal-
ance) one tends then to believe that the presence of the out 
M
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E
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false
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tru
false
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false
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false
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false
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M
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false
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H
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false
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false
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of balance could have been caused by a fault on the bend-
ing rotor or break of vanes and this scenario will lead to: 
 
 
(a) Absence a fault on the bending rotor 
 
(b) Absence a fault on the break of vanes 
Fig. 6 Scenario 2: Absence a fault on the out of balance 
 
 We suppose that the fault on the bending rotor 
(P(S  = false) = 1). With a probability value of P(S = true 
|M51 = false) =0.022). 
Fig. 6, a illustrates the probability of the event P(M5= 
false/ M51=true) = 8.50%. 
 We suppose that the fault on the bending rotor and 
break of vanes (P(S = false) = 1). With a probability value 
of P(S = true |M51 = false, M52 = false) =0.012). 
Fig. 6, b illustrates the probability of the event 
P(M5= false/ M51=true, M52=true) = 0%. 
According to this scenario the probability of 
occurrence of the top event P (motor-pump failed state) 
(P(S) is equal to 0.012). The result justifies the decrease in 
the probability value (from 18 to 1.2%) that the out of 
balance would be the cause of the unreliability of the 
motor pump, and this result is practically more credible 
giving the number of elements and components that are 
participated in its function and which can produce this 
faulty situation (motor-pump failed state).  
To improve the results analysis, uncertainties on 
the parameters "  " and " " have been taken into account. 
The associated 95 % confidence intervals for   and   
obtained using the Matlab function “wblfit” are [2.3984, 
4.3015] and [2356.4, 3050.8], respectively. We considered 
five values, uniformly generated, for each parameter:   
[ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ] = [2.398, 2.874, 3.349, 3.825, 4.301]; 
[ 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ] = [2356.42, 2530, 2703.58, 2877.17, 
3050.75]. 
The results obtained for both scenarios 1 and 2 are 
summarized in Table 3, 4 and 5 respectively. 
Table3 
Posterior probability of the top event for  
the first scenario with uncertainty on   and 
 

 
  
1  2
  3  4  5  
1
  0.267 0.231 0.196 0.178 0.156 
2
  0.248 0.219 0.191 0.167 0.146 
3  0.237 0.260 0.178 0.152 0.131 
4  0.227 0.191 0.161 0.135 0.113 
5  0.206 0.175 0.144 0.116 0.095 
 
Table4 
Posterior probability of the top event for the absence a 
fault on the bending rotor with uncertainty on   and 
 

 
  
1  2  3  4  5  
1  0.01 0.08 0.012 0.015 0.013 
2  0.044 0.038 0.032 0.018 0.017 
3  0.005 0.04 0.024 0.016 0.015 
4  0.026 0.03 0.021 0.015 0.014 
5  0.017 0.009 0.017 0.013 0.012 
 
Table5 
Posterior probability of the top event for the absence a 
fault on the break of vanes with uncertainty on   and 
 

 
  
1  2  3  4  5  
1  0.009 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.003 
2  0.012 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.005 
3  0.002 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.004 
4  0.014 0.01 0.007 0.004 0.003 
5  0.013 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.001 
 
M221
tru
false
21.6
78.4
M21
tru
false
2.50
97.5
M22
tru
false
75.4
24.6
M2
tru
false
76.0
24.0
M11
tru
false
28.0
72.0
M12
tru
false
55.9
44.1
M1
tru
false
68.2
31.8
M222
tru
false
68.6
31.4
M52
tru
false
91.5
8.50
M5
tru
false
91.5
8.50
M3
tru
false
33.0
67.0
M4
tru
false
23.4
76.6
E
tru
false
98.3
1.73
H
tru
false
83.0
17.0
M
tru
false
21.6
78.4
M51
tru
false
   0
 100
S
tru
false
.022
 100
M221
tru
false
21.6
78.4
M21
tru
false
2.50
97.5
M22
tru
false
75.4
24.6
M2
tru
false
76.0
24.0
M11
tru
false
28.0
72.0
M12
tru
false
55.9
44.1
M1
tru
false
68.2
31.8
M222
tru
false
68.6
31.4
M52
tru
false
   0
 100
M5
tru
false
   0
 100
M3
tru
false
33.0
67.0
M4
tru
false
23.4
76.6
E
tru
false
98.3
1.73
H
tru
false
83.0
17.0
M
tru
false
96.1
3.90
M51
tru
false
   0
 100
S
tru
false
.012
 100
 898 
We should notice that bending rotor (M51) is still 
the most likely event to stop the motor-pump for each 
couple (   , ).  
In order to characterize the uncertainty related to 
the posterior probabilities, we give hereafter the mean (𝜇) 
and the standard deviation (𝜎) for each scenario.    
- Scenario 1: 𝜇 = 0.1808, 𝜎 = 0.0474.  
- Scenario 2 (a): 𝜇 = 0.0221, 𝜎 = 0.0157. 
- Scenario 2 (b): 𝜇 = 0.0068, 𝜎 =0.0041. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper presents the application of bayesians 
networks and fault tree to diagnose motor- pump defects.  
The construction of the graphical model of the 
motor-pump (variable identification and their modes, caus-
al relationship, quantification of probabilities, etc.) was 
performed according to historical data.  
According to the fault tree results and the values 
of conditional probability, the presence of defects in the 
motor-pump are mainly caused by the event M51, which 
indicates that the defect of unbalance (M5) is the most 
likely source to stop the motor-pump.  
Fault tree method allows thanks to its qualitative 
and quantitative aspects, an event scenario leading to top 
undesirable events (motor-pump failed state). For diagno-
sis or to model multi-state variable system, bayesian net-
work is well adapted.  
Bayesian inferences permit to calculate the joint 
posterior probability of the different variables which can 
overcome the limitations of fault tree regarding the diagno-
sis.  
According to the scenarios modeled in this work 
the probability of occurrence of the top event P (motor-
pump failed state) = P(S) = 1.2%. This result is practically 
credible giving the number of elements and components 
that participate in its function and which can produce this 
faulty situation (motor-pump failed state).  
The Analysis of the obtained results by the meth-
odology of converting the fault tree into bayesian networks 
allowed to identify the undesirable and critical compo-
nents, and contributed in using the targeted preventive 
maintenance in order to increase the system’s reliability 
and availability. Thus, in order to optimize the availability 
of this motor pump rigorous monitoring of its behavior and 
an effective supervision must be carried out.  
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M. Medkour, L. Khochmane, A. Bouzaouit, O. Bennis 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF FAULT TREE INTO 
BAYESIAN NETWORK METHODOLOGY FOR 
FAULT DIAGNOSIS 
 
S u m m a r y 
 
In this article, we have shown an application of a 
decision support tool which is the FTBN. The combination 
of bayesian network (BN) with fault tree (FT) is an inter-
esting approach to diagnose mechanical systems. Bayesian 
networks provide robust probabilistic methods of reason-
ing under uncertainty, widely used in the field of reliability 
and fault diagnosis. Fault tree is a method of deductive 
analysis based on the realization of an arborescence used to 
identify combinations of failures. Since both tools have a 
probabilistic aspect, the main purpose of this work is to 
give a methodological approach based on the transfor-
mation method of fault tree into bayesian network to model 
a mechanical system, more specifically the fault diagnosis. 
Fault tree construction allows building a bayesi-
ans network.  Deriving the graphical structure of the bayes-
ian network will represent the causal relationship between 
the different events, and exploits the mass of existing data 
(experience feedback database) of the system under study. 
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In this paper a methodology approach is used to 
conduct quantification of conditionals probabilities of this 
network, and performed a diagnosis on the out of balance 
trough modeled scenarios. The proposed methodology in 
our paper is centred on the presence or absence of the out 
of balance of the motor-pump. Knowing that the source of 
this unbalance is caused by tows essentially events in the 
fault tree: bending rotor and break of vanes. This statement 
remains valid when uncertainties are taken into account.  
 
Keywords: bayesians network; fault tree; Probability; 
inference; modeling; diagnosis; maintenance.  
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